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In view of the importance of the subject it is unfortunate that so few
of the reported cases on equitable receiverships of corporations have
dealt in any comprehensive way with the principles underlying the
administrating of the fund for the benefit of creditors. The result
is that controversy has outstripped authoritative decision, and the
subject is unsettled. To this generalization an exception must be
noted in respect of the special topic of the application of current rail-
way income to current expenses, before the payment of mortgage
indebtedness.1 On another disputed topic, the provability of imma.ure
claims, the law, or at least the right principle of decision, has been
settled, by the notable opinion of Judge Noyes in Pennsylvania Steel
Company v. New York City Railway Company,2 followed and rein-
forced by that of Mr. Justice Holmes in William Filene's Sons Company
v. Weed.' Notwithstanding these important exceptions, the dearth of
authority on the general subject is such that Judge Noyes refers to a
case cited in his opinion as "almost the only case in which rules have
"been formulated with respect to the provability of claims against
"insolvent corporations."4
Upon the particular phase of the subject here discussed, the decisions
are to some extent in conflict, and no attempt seems to have been made
in text books or decisions to examine the question in the light of
principle. Black, for example, dismisses the subject by saying it. is
generally conceded that a receiver and the corporation whose property
is under his charge "are so far in privity that a judgment against the
* This paper deals only with judgments against the defendant in the receiver-
ship, regarded as evidence of the validity and amount of the judgment creditor's
claims for dividends to be paid out of the fund in the receiver's hands. It is
further limited to equitable receiverships of corporations, whose existence is not
terminated before the final decree. For convenience of discussion such judg-
ments are divided into three classes: those rendered before the receivership,
called judgments of the first class; those rendered after the receivership in
actions in which the receiver has intervened or assumed the defence, called
judgments of the second class; those rendered after the receivership in actions
in which the receiver has taken no part, called judgments of the third class.1 Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co. (i9o5) 197 U. S. 183, 25 Sup. Ct. 415.
'(1912, C. C. A. 2d) 198 Fed. 735.
'(1!18) 245 U. S. 597, 38 Sup. Ct. -II.
'i98 Fed. 741, n. 12, referring to N. 1. Security Co. v. Lombard Inv. Co.
(1896, C. C. W. D. Mo.) 73 Fed. 537.
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"latter will be conclusive against the former;
' ' 5 and the cases bear
out his statement so far as judgments of the first class go, although no
one has explained on what theory a receiver, who is the arm of the
court, can be bound by a judgment rendered before he was appointed.
Evidently he is .not bound by it in any proper sense, for he is not bound
to pay it in full or to the extent of the assets in his hands. The only
question to be discussed is whether it is binding in the sense of being
conclusive evidence of the validity and amount of the judgment debt.
And the true explanation of the admitted finality of judgments of the
first class is that a judgment against the corporation, when rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its jurisdiction, and
not imposed upon by fraud or collusion, is conclusive as against the
corporation in any other action between the same parties wherein the
same issues are involved; and an equitable receivership in which the
judgment creditor is invited to intervene, pro interesse suo, is such an
action.
In referring to such judgments as binding on the receiver as though
he were in privity of person or estate with the defendant corporation,
6
it is possible that the courts have failed to keep in mind the fact that a
receiver acts in several different representative capacities. For some
purposes he represents the corporation; for athers, the creditors who
are prevented by the receivership from pursuing their legal remedies;
and for others again, the court. When claims are presented to him for
allowance or rejection, he is acting for the time being as the represen-
tative of .the court, having the same duties and powers as a special
master in chancery, who is often appointed for that purpose when the
receiver's other duties are too onerous or the claims too numerous
for the receiver himself to attempt to pass upon them. The procedure
before the receiver is generally informal, but the issues tendered by each
claimant are well defined ;--whether the defendant corporation is
indebted, whether the debt can be liquidated according to law within
the time limited for the presentation of claims, and, if so, what the
amount is. When a claimant presents to the receiver in due season
an authenticated copy of a valid prior judgment against the defendant
corporation as proof of the fact that it is indebted to him and in the
sum adjudged, the receiver is indeed bound to admit it in evidence and
to give to it the probative effect to which it is legally entitled on those
issues. But say that the receiver is or is not estopped by the judgment
as if he were a party or a privy to the prior litigation and a defendant
in the receivership is to drag in a wholly unnecessary proposition quite
i Black, Judgments (2d ed. 19o2) sec. 585a See also High, Receivers (4th
ed. 1go) 436; Beach, Receivers (1887) sec. 468; Clark, Receivers (1918) secs.
767, 768; I Tardy's Smith, Receivers (192o) sec. 29.
'Stearns v. Lawrence (1897, C. C. A. 6th) 83 Fed. 738; Hopkins v. Taylor
(i877Y 87 Ill. 436; Attorney General v. Supreme Council (sgo7) 196 Mass. 1i,
81 N. E. 966; Pringle v. Woolworth (1882) go N. Y. 502.
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inconsistent with the quasi judicial position which he temporarily
occupies.
If any confirmation were needed of so elementary a proposition, it
would be found in the fact that the ultimate question is whether the
court of the Keceivership is bound, and no one would say that the court
was in privity with the defendant in the receivership. The truth is that
neither court nor receiver is bound by the judgment, but both are
bound by the rules of evidence.
The theory that the receiver is estopped by the judgment has more
force vhen applied to judgments of the second class in cases wherein
the receiver, by the order of or with the subsequent approval of the
appointing court, intervenes -in or controls the defence of an action
pending against the defendant; and yet it still remains true that
even in such a case the receiver is not bound by the judgment as such.
In his character as representative of the corporation and of the credi-
tors he is bound by the adjudication of the litigated issues, because
those interests have had their day in court by his representation; but
as custodian of the funds and representative of the court he is, not
bound by the sentence that the plaintiff recover of the defendant a
stated sum. The Supreme Court of Illinois has said in such a case;
"It is unnecessary to inquire whether, as an abstract proposition, the
doctrine of estoppel can be applied to the courts as well as to individ-
uals. It is sufficient to say that the proceedings of courts must be based
on the same principles of fairness which are ordinarily applied to the
conduct of individuals." 7
This language is commendable enough, but why not recognize the fact
that behind the manifest propriety of the observation by a court of
equity of the principles of fair dealing, lies the paramount rule of the
finality of the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiktion in another
action between the same parties on the same issues? This rule applies
both as an abstract and as a concrete proposition to courts 4s well as
to individuals, and it is therefore surprising to find that in explaining
the conclusive effect given to judgments of the second class in receiver-
ship proceedings, some courts have thought it necessary to adopt a
theory, apparently originating in Massachusetts," . that the court of the
receivership has permitted the claim to be'liquidated in another court,
or, as was said, passim, in a Connecticut case," that the court of
receivership has delegated to another jurisdiction the right to deter-
mine the extent and validity of the claims; as though the court of the
receivership had power to confer jurisdiction upon the courts of another
sovereignty, or withhold it, at pleasure.
It is of course a matter within the discretion of the receivership
'Smith v. United States Express Co. (i8go) 135 IIL 279, 293, 25 N. . 525, 528.
'Attorney General v. Supreme Council, supra note 6.
"Bashford-Burmister Co. v. Aetna Indemnity Co. (xgig) 93 Conn. i65, i8g, io5
Atd. 470, 478.
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court whether it will determine for itself all claims against the 
receiver,
or will allow them to be litigated elsewhere. That is only 
another
way of saying that unless expressly authorized by statute 
no suit can
be brought against the receiver without the permission of 
the court
which appointed him. And there is a phrase in Porter 
v. SabiW°
which, though probably not so intended, may be construed as meaning
that no claim against the defendant corporation may 
be -put in suit
in another tribunal, after the receivership, without the 
permission of
the court. But it is quite another thing to assume that 
courts of
another sovereignty may not continue to exercise a jurisdiction 
-in
personam which they have lawfully acquired over the defendant 
corpor-
ation before the receiver is appointed, without the permission 
of the
court of the receivership.
Of course no one claims in so many words that a court of 
equity
sitting in one jurisdiction may, by force of its own decree 
and by a
sequestration of local assets, deprive courts of another sovereignty 
of
a jurisdiction in personam already lawfully acquired, or parties suing
in a foreign court of their right to a trial by jury, or deprive 
judg-
ments in personam by courts of other states of their constitutional
sanction, or non-residents of their constitutional right to pursue 
an
existing corporation in the federal courts. But it has been claimed
that all these things may lkwfully be done indirectly, and as to local
assets completely accomplished, by a refusal of the court of the receiver-
ship to receive in evidence judgments of other courts rendered against
the defendant after the receivership in actions commenced before 
the
receivership, in which .the receiver has taken no part. Thus 
the
Massachusetts court speaking of judgments of the third class rendered
by courts of other states says,
"This [the receivership] had no direct effect on pending -actions. It
had, however, this indirect effect upon them. If the plaintiff in such
an action .wanted a judgment against the defendant corporation for
some purpose other than a right to share in the assets sequestrated by
and in the hands of this court, he could go on with his action. But if
he wished to establish his right to share in the assets in the possession
of this court the further. prosecution of that action would not help
him. To establish that right he had to prove his claim in this court
or get an order from this court that a judgment in the action in the
foreign court should establish his right to share in the assets here. It
is for the court which has taken the assets of an insolvent into its hands
for distribution and for that court alone to determine who its creditors
are and what is due to them respectively. . ."These judgments do not affect the receiver, and these judgments as
such cannot be proved against the funds in the hands of this court
through its receiver.""
It will be seen that the doctrine thus announced is not limited to the
proposition that no other court can create a lien or preference upon the
10 (1893) 149 U. S. 473, 479, 13 Sup. Ct. 1OO8, IoMo.
"i96 Mass. 157, 81 N. E. 967.
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fund after its sequestration. It goes to the wh6lly inconsistent length
of first admitting the jurisdiction of the foreign court to .render a valid
judgment in personam against the defendant corporation, and then
asserting that the judgment is not admissible as evidence of the judg-
ment debt. This result is not worked out by applying the technical
doctrine of merger, for that point was made and overruled. No
precedents are cited. The constitutional obligation of giving full force
and effect to the judgments of the courts of another state is ignored.
A reference is made by way of analogy to bankruptcy, but no analogy
exists, for bankruptcy is a purely statutory proceeding, and the jfirisdic-
tion of a bankruptcy court is exclusive and paramount. The only
reason assigned is as follows:
"The real objection to the proof of these death benefits is that they havegone to judgment since the date of the sequestration of the funds bythis court, and by reducing the several demands to a judgment againstthe corporation the petitioners have elected not to prove them against
the assets in the possession of this court."
In a later decision rendered in the course of the same receivership this
theory of election is more fully developed and a reference is again
made to the supposed analogous practice in bankruptcy.12 But no such
practice exists. On the contrary, section 63a (5) of the Bankruptcy
Act includes among provable claims those "founded upon provable
"debts reduced to judgments after the filing of the petition and before
"the consideration of the bankrupt's application for a discharge."
Thus, as Collier says, giving statutory recognition to the doctrine of
Boynion v. Ball,23 decided in 1887. Aside from that, the doctrine of
election between inconsistent remedies is not applicable because judg-
ments are good legal currency anywhere.
After all, the underlying question is one of jurisdiction. What are
the legal consequences of sequestration? Does it give the court power
to select the beneficiaries of the fund at its discretion, or are all creditors
who present claims capable of liquidation within the time limited
entitled as of right to share in the fund? Clark seems to intimate
that ,the court of the .receivership may prefer one unsecured creditor
to another.' 4 But it is unnecessary to argue that question, for the
Supreme Court has decided it, and Mr. Justice Holmes has stated the
rule, in William Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, with his usual clarity and
authority, as follows:
"When a statutory system is administered the only question for thecourts is what the statutes prescribe. But when the courts withoutstatute take possession of all the assets of a corporation under a billlike the present and so make it impossible to collect debts except from
2Hackett v. Supreme Council (gio) 2o6 Mass. 139, 142, 92 N. E. 133." (1887) 121 U. S. 457, 7 Sup. Ct 981. See 2 Collier, Bankruptcy (i2th ed.
1921) 973.
"Op. cit. note 5, at sec. 869.
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the court's hands, they have no warrant for excludiig creditors or for
introducing supposed equities other than those determined by the
contracts which the debtor was content to make, and the creditor 
to
accept. In order to'make a distribution possible they must of necessity
limit the time for the proof of claims. But they have no authority to
give to the filing of the bill the effect of the filing of a petition in bank-
ruptcy' 5 so as to exclude any previously made and lawful claim 
that
matures within a reasonable time before distribution can be made.




Lord Romilly puts the same doctrine into an epigram when 
he says,
"The receiver was not appointed for the purpose of keeping 
persons
"out of their rights.""' And if that be true, the argument against the
doctrine of the Massachusetts case is complete, without appealing 
to the
constitutional obligation whict that case disregards.
Upon the other side of the precise question and in direct conflict 
with
the Massachusetts case stands the New York Court of Appeals.1
8 A
receiver had been appointed in New York over a fire insurance company,
and afterwards the company was sued in Pennsylvania, and a 
judg-
ment in that action was held to be admissible and conclusive in 
the
receivership, though the receiver had taken no part in the Pennsylvania
litigation. The court points out that until judgment dissolving 
the
corporation the policy sued on could be enforced against the company
as well after as before the appointment of the receiver, and says,
"The receiver holds the property and the estate of the corporation 
as
an officer of this court, for the purpose of distribution among 
the
creditors and stockholders, and in the absence of fraud or collusion,
neither of which is alleged in regpect to the Pennsylvania. judgment,
the receiver and the other creditors are bound thereby. If any reason
existed to question the judgment against the company it was the duty
of the receiver to apply to the court that rendered it to reopen the judg-
ment and to be permitted to defend."
It is submitted that this is the right rule of decision, and that the proba;
tive effect of a valid judgment in personam can not-be ignored 
in
another action against the defendant corporation in which the 
judgment
creditor has intervened as of right. In the New York. City Railway
receivership, Judge Lacombe adopted this view, although the question
was not in litigation before him. And in directing the procedure 
before
the special master he said,
"he will, of course, follow the decisions of the higher courts of the
state on all questions touching the construction of the state statute
under which the claim arises, and in all instances where a claim shall
" See Schall v. Camors (192o) 251 U. S. 239, 40 Sup. Ct. 135.
e 245 U. S. 602, 38 Sup. Ct. 213.
17Eyton v. Denbigh Ry. (i868) L. tR 6 Eq. 14.
"Pringle %F. Woolworth, supra note 6, cited with approval in Lafayette 
Trust
Co. V. Beggs (1915) 213 N. Y. 28o, iO7 N. E. 644, and Nicholas v. 
Lord (i9o8)
193 N. Y. 388, 85 N. E. lO83.
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have been adjudicated in the state court before it is taken up for consid-eration by him will liquidate in conformity to the decisions of the saidcourts, except in cases where newly discovered evidence may show thatsuch court was imposed upon."'19
In Pringle v. Woolwo.th the judgment was rendered in an action
brought after the receivership and in principle it should make no
difference whether the action was instituted before or after the receiver-
ship, provided the .corporation remained in existence and was duly
served with process and the judgment was rendered in time to be
seasonably presented to the receiver. Nor should it make any difference
in principle whether the judgment is rendered in a court of the same
sovereignty, or in a court of another state; except that in the latter
case the rule of evidence is reinforced by the constitutional mandate.
The New York rule does not conflict with the undoubted exclusive
jurisdiction arising from the seizure, whereby the property is with-
drawn from the jurisdiction of all other courts, "as effectually as if it
"had been entirely removed to another jurisdiction ;"20 nor with the
ancillary jurisdiction, arising from the sequestration, "to hear and deter-
"mine all questions affecting the title, possession, or control of the
"property."'2 ' The question is simply one of the admissibility and effect
of evidence; and the obligation to receive a judgment in evidence is no
more derogatory to the jurisdiction in rem than the obligation to receive
in evidence a promissory note or other admissible evidence of debt.
If it be suggested that equity requires that all claims be liquidated
by a uniform rule of decision, the answer is that the way to get that
result, consistently with the rules of evidence and the Constitution, is
by a statute summarily terminating, or authorizing the court of the
receivership summarily to terminate, the corporate existence of the
defendant. In the absence of such a statute the court has no power to
prevent other courts from acquiring or exercising jurisdiction in
personam over the defendant, or to depriv!e non-resident plaintiffs
of their right to sue in the courts of their own domicil.
The disinclination of the court of the receivership to submit to the
supposed dictation of another court in respect of the validity and amount
of a claim on -the fund may not be entirely unnatural, but it is purely
sentimental. No court has the right to assume that a judgment of
another court of competent jurisdiction is unjust; and if such other
court had jurisdiction of the defendant and was not imposed upon, its
judgment on the same issues between the same parties is conclusive in
any tribunal which administers justice according to law. Even so,
the fund cannot be reached except by. the judgment of the court of the
receivership.
"Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. (19o8, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 161 Fed.
785.
'Palmer v. Texas (190o) 212 U. S. 118, 125, 29 Sup. Ct. 230, 232.
' Murphy v. Hofan Co. (igog) 211 U. S. 562, 569, 29 Sup. Ct 15, 156.
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